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Abstract
This paper introduces a new database of voice recordings with
the goal of supporting research on vulnerabilities and protection
of voice-controlled systems (VCSs). In contrast to prior efforts,
the proposed database contains both genuine voice commands
and replayed recordings of such commands, collected in real-
istic VCSs usage scenarios and using modern voice assistant
development kits. Specifically, the database contains record-
ings from four systems (each with a different microphone array)
in a variety of environmental conditions with different forms of
background noise and relative positions between speaker and
device. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first publicly
available database1 that has been specifically designed for the
protection of state-of-the-art voice-controlled systems against
various replay attacks in various conditions and environments.
Index Terms: replay attack, spoofing attack, voice-controlled
system, microphone array, voice corpus
1. Introduction
Recently, an increasing number of voice-controlled systems
(VCSs) have been introduced that rely on voice input as the
primary user-machine interaction modality. For example, in-
telligent personal assistants such as Amazon Echo and Google
Home allow users to control their smart home appliances, adjust
thermostats, activate home security systems, purchase items on-
line, initiate phone calls, and complete many other tasks with
ease. VCSs also began to be used in vehicles to allow drivers
to control their cars’ navigation systems and other vehicle ser-
vices. Despite their convenience, VCSs raise new security
concerns due to their vulnerability to multiple types of spoof-
ing attacks, such as replay attacks, self-triggered attacks [1],
hidden voice commands [2, 3], and audio adversarial exam-
ples [4, 5, 6, 7]. Such attacks pose significant threats, because
they can easily be hidden and conducted remotely, and can be
used to attack many systems simultaneously [8].
In order to defend against these attacks, the work presented
in [9] and [10] each proposes a defense strategy to protect VCSs
by identifying the sound source of the received voice commands
and rejecting those that are not from a human speaker, merely
by analyzing the acoustic cues within the voice commands. This
approach is based on the observation that legitimate voice com-
mands should only come from human speakers rather than a
playback device and that attacks such as self-triggered attacks,
hidden voice commands, and audio adversarial examples rely
on a playback device. That is, we are able to leverage the differ-
ences in the sound production mechanisms of humans and play-
back devices, which lead to differences in the frequencies and
the directivity of the output voice signal. For example, in [9],
the authors leverage the presence of significant low-frequency
signals to distinguish electronic speakers from human speakers,
while in [10], the authors use a combination of features includ-
1Data available at https://github.com/yuangongnd/remasc
ing fundamental frequency and Mel-frequency cepstral coeffi-
cients (MFCCs), and propose a data-driven approach.
The key idea in [9, 10] is actually an extension of the anti-
spoofing technologies used for protecting automatic speaker
verification (ASV) systems. Many prior efforts (such as pre-
sented in [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]) have
attempted to differentiate between original and replayed speech
using the RedDots Replayed data set [23]. While the VCS and
ASV protection tasks look similar, they have some important
differences, e.g., they have fundamental different user scenar-
ios: ASV systems usually assume that the user speaks in a con-
trolled environment and in close proximity to the systems, while
modern VCSs usually support far-field speech recognition and
are often used in a variety of environmental conditions indoors
and outdoors. With increasing distance, the effects of environ-
mental noise grow rapidly, which may impact the features the
protection model relies on. In addition, modern VCSs usually
feature microphone arrays, which can assist with sound source
identification through directivity cues, while ASV systems usu-
ally have a single microphone only. We provide a more detailed
discussion of these differences in Section 2. Therefore, since
the RedDots Replayed data set has been recorded with short
speaker-device distances, in indoor environments, and with de-
vices that use a single microphone, it is not a suitable choice
for research on VCS protection. Consequently, prior VCS pro-
tection research [9, 10] relied on self-collected non-public data
for their experiments, where these data sets typically contain
samples from a small number of subjects (≤ 8), limited envi-
ronmental settings and number of voice commands (≤ 8), and
only in single-microphone settings. The 2019 ASVspoof chal-
lenge [24] provides simulated data for clear theoretical analy-
sis of audio spoofing attacks in physical environments, but also
leaves the simulation-to-reality gap. Therefore, in order to facil-
itate future research on the protection of VCSs, we present the
ReMASC (Realistic Replay Attack Microphone Array Speech
Corpus) data set, which, compared to the RedDots Replayed
data set and the data sets used in [9, 10], has more data vari-
ety and is closer to realistic VCS usage scenarios and settings.
Specifically, the data set contains recordings from 50 subjects of
both genders and with different ages and accents. The record-
ings have been obtained in four different environments (two in-
door, one outdoor, and one moving vehicle scenario) with vary-
ing types and levels of noise, and consisting of 132 voice com-
mands. The distance between speaker and device varies from
0.5m to 6m, the data set for the indoor environments uses dif-
ferent placements of the VCS device, and different VCS devices
(with different microphone configurations) are used.
2. Comparing VCS and ASV Protection
While prior work has investigated approaches to differentiate
between original and replayed voices, the focus has been on
anti-spoofing of ASV systems. At first glance, VCSs and ASV
systems appear similar, but there are important differences that
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prevent us from directly reusing data sets designed for ASV pro-
tection for research on VCS protection.
First, in ASV applications, the microphone is usually po-
sitioned close to the user (i.e., less than 0.5m). At such short
distances, certain acoustic features can be used to identify the
sound source of the speaker, e.g., in [25], the authors use the
“pop noise” caused by breathing to identify a live speaker.
Other efforts [26, 27] do not explicitly use close-distance fea-
tures, but the databases they use to develop their defense strate-
gies were recorded at close distances [23, 28, 29], and there-
fore, these approaches may also implicitly use close-distance
features. In contrast, with the help of far-field speech recogni-
tion techniques, modern VCSs can typically accept voice com-
mands from rather long distances (i.e., several meters) [10]. At
such distances, close-distance features cannot be used to distin-
guish between human speakers and recorded voice, e.g., the pop
noise effect quickly disappears over larger distances, and the in-
creasing effect of environmental noise may impact the features
the protection model relies on. Further, modern VCSs usually
allow the user to use it in a variety of environments, which also
increases the protection challenge.
Second, modern ASV systems typically use a strict speaker
verification model. Therefore, an attacker must either secretly
record (e.g., via telephone or far-field microphones) or synthe-
size (e.g., using voice conversion or cutting and pasting) the vic-
tim’s voice as a malicious voice command [30]. In both cases,
various cues, such as channel and background noise [31, 32] or
cutting-pasting traces [32], will be left in the source recording
used to replay (i.e., 2 in Figure 1), which can be used to de-
tect the attack. In contrast, for usability considerations, VCSs
typically use less strict speaker verification, e.g., in [33], the au-
thors report that similar voices can activate Siri. In fact, speaker
verification is not a mandatory or default setting of many VCSs
such as Google Home or Amazon Alexa, while other VCSs do
not even have a speaker verification function (e.g., Xiaomi MI
AI, a smart home control device). This makes it easier for an
attacker to obtain a clean source recording for replay, e.g., by
recording the voice from a person with a similar pitch at a close
distance or by synthesizing a similar voice or building an ad-
versarial example. Therefore, a robust defense model for VCSs
should focus on detecting differences in the playback phase.
Third, modern VCSs typically rely on microphone arrays,
which allows them to perform far-field speech recognition,
while ASV systems usually use a single microphone. For ex-
ample, the Amazon Echo Dot has a 7-microphone array and
Google Home Mini has a 2-microphone array. This can be
an important characteristic for future research, i.e., a micro-
phone array could be used to detect the directivity of the sound
source or conduct noise canceling before spoof detection. How-
ever, existing data sets ignore this completely and only provide
recordings using a single microphone.
3. ReMASC Data Collection
3.1. Definitions and Data Collection Strategy
A typical VCS replay attack is illustrated in the lower part of
Figure 1. An attacker first needs to prepare a replay source
recording (i.e., 2 in Figure 1), which can be done by either
recording a speaker (using a source recorder) or by performing
speech synthesis. The attacker can then replay it using a re-
play device and the replayed recording (i.e., 3 in Figure 1)
is captured by the VCS device. In contrast, a legitimate usage
scenario is illustrated in the upper part of Figure 1, where a gen-
uine recording (i.e., 1 in Figure 1) is directly captured by the
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Figure 1: An illustration of legitimate usage of a VCS (upper
figure) and a replay attack (lower figure).
Table 1: Microphone array settings
Device Sample Rate Bit Depth #Channels
Amlogic 113X1 16000 16 7
Respeaker 4 Linear 44100 16 4
Respeaker V2 44100 32 6
Google AIY 44100 16 2
VCS device. A defense task is then to build a model that is able
to distinguish genuine recordings from replayed recordings.
As shown in Figure 2, in our data collection, the subject holds
the source recorder in the hand when speaking into the micro-
phone arrays (which emulates the VCS device). When the sub-
ject speaks the voice command, both the source recorder and the
microphone array record simultaneously. We define the record-
ing captured by the microphone array as the genuine recording,
and the recording captured by the source recorder as the replay
source recording. Then, we play the replay source recording
multiple times in different settings into the microphone array
again, and refer to the recording captured by the microphone ar-
ray as the replayed recording. The ReMASC data set provides
all three types of recording. Note that different from previous
work [23], we do not use genuine recordings as replayed source
recordings because they may contain a high level of noise in our
far-field setting. We also emulate situations where the attacker
uses speech synthesis to generate replay source recordings (i.e.,
there is no genuine recording).
3.2. Text Materials and Recording Subjects
A total of 132 voice commands are used as the recording text
material. Among them, 31 commands are security sensitive and
49 commands are used in the vehicle. The command list con-
tains 273 unique words, which provides reasonable phonetic
diversity. We recruited 50 subjects (22 female and 28 male),
where 36 subjects are English native speakers, 12 subjects are
Chinese native speakers, and 2 subjects are Indian native speak-
ers. The subjects’ ages range from 18 to 36. Three subjects
participated more than once, leading to a total of 55 sets (i.e.,
47 subjects with one set and 3 with several sets of recordings).
3.3. Microphone Array Based Recorder
Due to privacy concerns, off-the-shelf VCS products such as
Amazon Echo or Google Home do not allow developers to ac-
cess the raw audio. Therefore, we use the following VCS de-
velopment kits in our work: A) Amlogic A113X1 (4-mic trian-
gle or 6-mic circular array); B) Respeaker 4-mic linear array;
C) Respeaker Core V2 (6-mic circular array); and D) Google
AIY Voice Kit (2-mic linear array). As illustrated in Figure 3,
in all experiments, we mount the four microphone arrays on a
stand and for all recording devices, we use the Advanced Linux
Sound Architecture (ALSA) to collect multi-channel waveform
files. We use the highest possible recording quality for each
kit (summarized in Table 1). Practical VCSs might use lower
sampling rates and bit depths to lower the computational and
network transmission overheads.
(A) Outdoor Environment (B) Indoor Environment 1 
(C) Indoor Environment 2 (D) Moving Vehicle Environment 
Figure 2: The recording environments and conditions.
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Figure 3: Microphone arrays used in the data collection (mi-
crophones are shown with the rectangles and a arrow indicates
the direction of the microphone array during data collection).
3.4. Source Recorder and Playback Devices
As discussed in Section 2, in the worst case, the attacker may
have a high-quality replay source file. A robust defense model
should still be able to detect the replay attack. To study if the
source recorder affects the replay attack detection, we use a low-
cost recorder, i.e., an iPod Touch (Gen5), and a professional
recorder, i.e., a Tascam DR-05, together as the source recorder.
As shown in Figure 5, we tape the two recorders together and
ask the subject to hold it at a close distance when they speak
into the VCS (microphone array). The captured recording is
then used as the replay source recording. Although the Tascam
DR-05 is a professional high fidelity device, channel and back-
ground noise are still inevitable. Therefore, we also use Google
Text-to-speech (TTS) to synthesize the voice commands as ad-
ditional replay source recordings, which can then be considered
as completely channel and background noise free. For diver-
sity considerations, we use 26 different voice settings (13 male
and 13 female) with two different synthesis technologies (stan-
dard and WaveNet) and three dialect settings (Australia, UK,
and U.S.). As shown in Figure 5, we use four common represen-
tative playback devices: A) Sony SRSX5, B) Sony SRSX11, C)
Audio Technica ATH-AD700X headphone, and D) iPod Touch.
Further, in the vehicle environment, we use the built-in vehicu-
lar audio system (of a Dodge Grand Caravan) as an additional
playback device (i.e., connect an iPod to the car’s audio system).
3.5. Recording Environment
We performed the data collections in four environments:
Outdoor environment (Env-A): To emulate uncontrolled
noise in outdoor environments, we collected data on a student
plaza with various background noises such as chatting, traffic,
and wind. The speaker-recorder distance ranges from 0.5-1.5m.
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Figure 4: Illustration of device and speaker position settings. In
indoor environment 1, each hollow symbol represents a micro-
phone array placement and the direction it faces is indicated by
an arrow. The corresponding solid symbols of the same shape
represent a speaker position (for a total of 18 device placement
- speaker position combinations, can be generalized to more
combinations since the array is symmetric). In indoor environ-
ment 2, the hollow circle represents the microphone array, the
square represents the speaker playing the background sound,
and the solid circle represents the speaker. In the moving ve-
hicle environment, the white square represents the microphone
array placement and the direction it faces is indicated by the
arrow; the circles represent the speaker positions.
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Figure 5: Playback device (left figure) and source recorder
(right figure) used in the data collection.
Indoor environment 1 (Env-B): Modern VCSs usually allow
flexible device placement and speaker positions. To emulate
this, we performed data collections in a quiet study room us-
ing three device placement settings: corner of the room, against
the wall, and center of the room. For each device placement,
the speaker spoke in six locations, forming 18 different position
combinations (illustrated in Figure 4).
Indoor environment 2 (Env-C): In realistic scenarios, VCSs
will receive voice commands while some background sounds
might be playing. In such situations, although there is an elec-
tronic device playing sounds, the VCS should not reject the
user’s voice command. This requires a defense model that is
able to precisely detect the sound source of the voice command
rather than that of the entire received audio. To emulate this sit-
uation, we collected data in a lounge where music players and
TVs were running in the background (illustrated in Figure 4).
Device and speaker positions were fixed.
Vehicle environment (Env-D): To emulate a vehicle-based
VCS, we collected data in a moving vehicle (Dodge Grand Car-
avan). As shown in Figure 4, the microphone array was placed
at the center console and the subjects spoke while sitting in dif-
ferent seats (except the driver’s seat for safety consideration).
It is very common that the driver will make voice commands;
therefore, about half of the data was collected from position 1
in Figure 4. Each subject was asked to say 49 vehicle-related
voice commands twice, once in a silent environment (parking
lot when the engine is off) and once when the car is moving.
The source recording obtained from a silent environment was
then used for replay. We collected the data in various environ-
ments (e.g., campus, residential area, urban area, and highway),
with speeds ranging from 3 to 40 miles per hour.
3.6. Replay Settings
For each replay source recording collected by each source
recorder, we replayed it multiple times with different playback
devices. In indoor environment 2 and the vehicle environment,
the position of the playback device was identical to the subject’s
position. In the outdoor environment and indoor environment
1, we also replayed it in different positions. To keep the data
collection effort reasonable, each replay source recording was
replayed in 1 to 3 randomly selected replay settings, while the
replay settings are uniformly distributed. All replay and genuine
recordings were collected in the same environments with simi-
lar volume. Further, for each recording environment, we did our
best to make everything in the environment identical for both
genuine recordings and replay recordings. As shown in Table 2,
9,240 genuine and 45,472 replayed recordings were collected
(a recording captured by each microphone array is regarded as
one recording regardless of the number of microphones).
3.7. Data Availability
The ReMASC corpus is publicly available online for research
purpose. Currently, two disjoint sets have been released. First,
the Quick Evaluation Set consists of a small number
(∼2,000) of representative samples covering all recording con-
ditions. This set can be used for quick evaluation of the per-
formance of existing anti-spoofing models (e.g., models trained
on RedDots Replayed data set) in the realistic settings of our
data set. Second, the Core Set consists of ∼27,000 samples,
which allows a user to build, validate, and evaluate the defense
model as well as analyze the impact of factors such as the type
of playback device and microphone. The rest of the data is re-
served as an additional evaluation set for future defense model
comparison and will be released in the future.
4. Experimentation and Conclusions
We performed four baseline experiments and present the results
in Table 3. For comparison with the RedDots Replayed data set,
we use the first channel of each multi-channel audio and down-
sample it to 16KHz for the ReMASC data set. Since the purpose
is to study the impact of the data set, we fix the classification al-
gorithm for all experiments. Specifically, we use the official
ASVspoof 2017 Challenge baseline CQCC-GMM model [34]
using constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCC) [13, 35] features
and Gaussian mixture model (GMM) classifier and use exactly
the same hyper-parameters. We further use conventional equal
error rate (EER) as the metric.
First, we train the baseline CQCC-GMM model using the
Reddot Replayed data set (training + development set), and then
test it on the ReMASC data set. This is to evaluate if the de-
fense model trained with data collected in partially controlled
indoor environments with short speaker-microphone distances
can be generalized to realistic VCS usage scenarios. The trained
defense model (referred to as RedDots Pre-trained in Table 3)
achieves 23.9% EER (our reproduction, slightly differs from the
result of 24.7% reported in [34]) on the evaluation set of the
RedDots Replayed data set, but performs much worse on the
ReMASC data set (note that the lower bound of EER is 50%),
indicating that the performance of the anti-spoofing model is
sensitive to the environment and replay/recording settings, and
may fail to work in (unseen) realistic scenarios. Second, we
train the baseline CQCC-GMM model with both RedDots Re-
Table 2: Data volume of the ReMASC corpus (* indicates in-
complete data due to recording device crashes).
Environment # Subjects # Genuine # Replayed
Outdoor 12 960 6,900
Indoor 1 23 2,760* 23,104
Indoor 2 10 1,600 7,824
Vehicle 10 3,920 7,644
Total 55 9,240 45,472
Table 3: Accuracy of baseline countermeasures (EER, %) in
various environments of the ReMASC data set.
Env-A Env-B Env-C Env-D
RedDots Pre-trained 47.1 44.5 49.0 39.6
Env-Independent 19.9 39.9 34.6 48.9
Env-Dependent 13.5 17.4 21.3 22.1
played (training + development set) and entire ReMASC data
set together, then test it on the RedDots Replayed evaluation set
and achieve an EER of 20.2%, which is 3.7% lower than the
EER achieved by the model trained with only the RedDots Re-
played data set, indicating that training a defense model with
additional data collected in various uncontrolled realistic condi-
tions can also improve its performance in relatively controlled
conditions. Third, we evaluate the defense performance when
the target environment is unseen by the model using the Re-
MASC data set. Specifically, when testing in each target envi-
ronment, we train the baseline CQCC-GMM model using data
of three environments other than the target environment (re-
ferred to as Env-Independent in Table 3). We observe that the
trained models perform noticeably better than the RedDots Pre-
trained model (except Env-D), but are still unsatisfactory, es-
pecially when the speaker speaks from various distances to the
microphone (e.g., Env-B) or the environment has complex noise
(Env-C & D). This indicates that the environment and recording
scenario do have a large impact on the defense model. Fourth,
we evaluate the defense performance when the target environ-
ment is seen by the model. For each environment, we split
the ReMASC data set randomly into two disjoint and speaker-
independent sets of roughly same size and then train the base-
line CQCC-GMM defense model (referred to as Env-Dependent
in Table 3) on one set and test on the other. We observe a re-
markable improvement compared with RedDots Pre-trained and
the Env-Independent model, indicating that the defense model
can be significantly strengthened if it has knowledge about the
target environment, even when the speaker is unknown.
To conclude, in this paper, we present the ReMASC data
set, which has been built with the goal to advance future re-
search on VCS protection. Compared with previous efforts,
the new corpus is much closer to realistic VCS usage scenarios
and settings and contains more data variety. Using evaluations
with the proposed data set, we find that the performance of the
conventional CQCC-GMM model drops significantly when the
training and target conditions are mismatched. Defense model
trained with data collected in various settings has some, but lim-
ited generalization ability to an unseen scenario. Many open
research questions can now be studied using this new data set,
e.g., can we construct domain-invariant features and models for
audio spoofing detection, can we build domain adaptation al-
gorithms to adapt a pre-trained defense model to a new condi-
tion, and can we use multi-channel microphone arrays to further
improve the defense performance (e.g., using sound directivity
features or conducting noise canceling before spoof detection)?
The proposed data set can contribute to future research to build
stronger and more effective defense models for VCSs.
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